A.R. 7581 [slip opn. on Supreme Court's web site].) This memorandum represents some very preliminary thoughts on the apparent implications of Blakely for California sentences. We expect to supplement or update these comments in the coming days and weeks and may also post sample "Blakely arguments" as they become available.
In the course of responding to the dissenters, the Blakely majority spoke of "our commitment to Apprendi in this context" and "the need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial." (Ibid.) The majority described Apprendi as a "bright-line rule" and rejected the notion that the jury trial right should depend on some assessment of the degree of judicial factfinding in the sentencing process, such as whether the statutory scheme went "too far" or allowed "the tail to wag the dog." (Id. at p. 12.) "As Apprendi held, every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to the jury all facts legally essential to the punishment." (Id. at p. 17, emphasis in original.) While the majority rejected the notion that its holding would imperil the very concept of "determinate sentencing," the opinion implies that, to pass muster, a determinate sentencing scheme must rely upon jury fact-finding.
Determinate judicial-factfinding schemes entail less judicial power than indeterminate schemes, but more judicial power than determinate jury-factfinding schemes. Whether Apprendi increases judicial power overall depends on what States with determinate judicial-factfinding schemes would do, given the choice between the two alternatives. (Id. at p. 13, emphasis in original.)
Finally, the opinion makes clear that, as with the right to jury trial on the underlying offense itself, "nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights" -either by "stipulat[ing] to the relevant facts or [by] consent [ing] to judicial factfinding. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 14.)
The state is likely to argue that, to the extent there is any analogy between the Washington and California sentencing schemes, the triad of lower, middle, and upper terms prescribed for an offense (e.g., 2-3-4) is the functional equivalent of the "standard range" (49 to 53 months) for the kidnaping offense in Blakely. Under that theory, an "exceptional sentence" finding justifying a "departure" from the "standard range" would be considered comparable to a California enhancement imposed on top of the base term. But a close examination of California sentencing law through the prism of Blakely reveals a different -and somewhat counter-intuitive -picture. In Apprendi/Blakely terms, the middle term is the true "statutory maximum," because an upper term requires additional findings -i.e., "aggravating circumstances" -beyond those inherent in the offense itself.
California statutes, court rules, and case law unequivocally provide that, unless there is a finding of at least one aggravating circumstances, a court cannot impose the upper-term: "When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." (Pen. Code § 1170(b) , emphasis added; accord Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(a) & (b); 1 cf., e.g., People v. Piceno (1987 ) 195 Cal.App.3d 1353 , 1360 As with the "standard range" in Blakely, the mid-term is the presumptive sentence. And, as with the "exceptional sentence" in Blakely, a California court lacks statutory authority to impose an upper term unless it finds "aggravating circumstances" beyond the elements inherent in the offense itself.
Like the Washington statutes, the California rules provide a list of enumerated aggravating circumstances (rule 4.421), but the list is "not exclusive" and a court may rely upon an nonenumerated circumstance "reasonably related" to the sentencing decision. (Rule 4.408(a) ; see e.g., People v. Garcia (1989) California's "dual use" rule underscores the necessity of finding additional facts, for a court cannot base an upper term on a fact which is either an element of the underlying offense or is the basis for an enhancement. ( § 1170(b) ; rules 4.420(c) & (d).) Thus, the aggravating circumstances authorizing an upper term are almost necessarily facts beyond those determined by the jury's offense verdicts and enhancement findings (unless the court elects to strike an enhancement and instead use the enhancing facts to impose the upper term (rule 4.420(c))). Put another way, where the only aggravating circumstances are those which overlap either the offense or any enhancement, the middle term is the "maximum" sentence a defendant may receive. It is only a finding of some additional non-overlapping aggravating circumstance which can "expose" a defendant to an upper term. "The judge acquires that authority [to impose an upper term] only upon finding some additional fact.
[Fn.]" (Blakely, supra, at p. 9.) Consequently, under the Sixth Amendment reasoning of Blakely and Apprendi, a defendant is entitled to jury determination of any such aggravating circumstance used to impose an upper term. Additionally, those findings must be subject to a reasonable doubt standard of proof (id. at pp. 5, 15), rather than a preponderance standard, as California law currently provides (rule 4.420(b)).
While the most obvious field for application of Blakely is the determination of aggravating circumstances used to impose an upper base term, its reasoning should also apply to those enhancements which provide a triad of possible enhancement terms. (E.g., § § 12022.5(a) [3-, 4-, or 10-yr enhancement for firearm use], 12022.3(a) [3-, 4-, or 10-yr enhancement for deadly weapon use during sex offense], 12022.7(e) [3-, 4-, or 5-yr enhancement for infliction of GBI during domestic violence offense].) As with the selection of the base term for the offense itself ( § 1170(b) ), the rules provide, "When the defendant is subject to an enhancement that was charged and found true for which three possible terms are specified by statute, the middle term shall be imposed unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation..." (Rule 4.428(b) .) As with the choice of an upper term for the underlying offense, the court must select the middle-term enhancement unless there are aggravating circumstances. Consequently, just as Apprendi requires jury determination of the facts necessary to establish the enhancement itself (e.g., weapon use, GBI), under Blakely the jury should also determine any additional aggravating facts which are used to support an upper-term on the enhancement, rather than the presumptive middle term.
Limited to aggravating circumstances exposing defendant to an upper term. Assuming that Blakely does have some applicability to California's Determinate Sentencing Law based on the structural considerations discussed above, what is the scope of the right to "determinate juryfactfinding" (Blakely, supra, at p. 13)? That is, which specific DSL determinations potentially come within Blakely? Those questions require considerations of some of the crucial limits the Supreme Court has placed on the scope of Apprendi in other contexts.
First, the Supreme Court has limited the Apprendi rights (jury trial, proof beyond reasonable doubt, etc.) to factual findings necessary to expose a defendant to a sentence greater than the maximum term otherwise provided for the underlying offense. It has refused to extend those rights to facts which trigger "mandatory-minimums" or which otherwise fix the length of the sentence, but which do not increase the maximum allowable sentence. (Harris v. United States (2002) While Blakely may alter our understanding of the "authorized range" permitted by the jury's findings -i.e., in California, the middle term should be considered the "maximum" unless there have been findings of aggravating circumstances -it does not seem to affect the basic lessons of Harris. The focus of Apprendi and its progeny remains on findings which are necessary to increase the sentence beyond the maximum otherwise allowed by the jury's verdict. Consequently, it is likely that Blakely applies only to determination of aggravating factors which expose a defendant to a potential upper term, but not to mitigating factors. If there is no right to jury determination of a fact which actually alters the available range of sentencing by increasing the lower term or by precluding probation, it is difficult to see how Apprendi could apply to criteria which operate less rigidly and simply guide the sentencing court's discretion in choosing a term within the range already authorized by the jury's verdict. Significantly, the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances simply allows a sentencing court to impose a middle term; they do not entitle a defendant to a lower term or preclude imposition of a middle or upper term. This is a matter which may well be revisited in the future. If the initial Blakely challenges to findings of aggravating factors are successful, it may be possible to build upon those cases, especially if any courts describe Blakely's principles in broad terms which could conceivably apply to mitigating factors. But, at least for the "first round" of Blakely appeals, it does not appear realistic to demand jury determination of mitigating factors.
Factfinding not discretion. Sentencing decisions typically involve two different kinds of determinations -findings of facts (e.g., weapon use) and the exercise of discretion or judgment as to the most appropriate sentence. Apprendi and Blakely appear to focus strictly on the right to jury determination of facts, which expose a defendant to the possibility of a sentence greater than the maximum allowed by the jury's findings. The Apprendi/Blakely majority has no quarrel with judicial sentencing discretion, provided that jurors have made all the purely factual findings necessary to authorize a maximum sentence. As the Blakely opinion noted:
Nor does it matter that the judge must, after finding aggravating facts, make a judgment that they present a compelling ground for departure. He cannot make that judgment without finding some facts to support it beyond the bare elements of the offense. Whether the judicially determined facts require a sentence enhancement or merely allow it, the verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. (Blakely, supra, at p. 9 fn. 8, emphasis in original.)
That footnote implies that "determinate jury-factfinding" (id. at p. 13) will bear greater resemblance to jury findings on conventional enhancements than to the jury's role in the penalty phase of a California capital trial. That is, under the Blakely's construction of the Sixth Amendment the jury, not the judge, must find the existence of any aggravating facts (such as those enumerated in rule 4.421(a)), which are used to support an upper term (subject to the recidivism limitation discussed below). But (in contrast to a capital jury's role in choosing between death and LWOP) Blakely would not appear to entitle a defendant to jury determination of the choice between a middle and upper term. That normative or discretionary judgment -including the weighing of aggravating factors found by the jury and the balancing of those factors against mitigating circumstances -would likely remain with the sentencing judge.
Not applicable to recidivist aggravating factors. One glaring anomaly continues to plague all aspects of Apprendi practice. Two years before Apprendi, the Court ruled (5-4) that there was no right to jury trial (or proof beyond a reasonable doubt) on a prior conviction allegation even where the prior conviction significantly increased the maximum allowable sentence. (Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224.) The Apprendi majority opinion did not overrule AlmendarezTorres, but purported to distinguish it (even while acknowledging "it is arguable that AlmendarezTorres was incorrectly decided"). (Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 489.) "Both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that 'fact' in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a 'fact' increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range. [Fn.]" (Apprendi, supra, at p. 488.) Consequently, as reiterated in Blakely, the core holding of Apprendi is: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at p. 490, emphasis added; Blakely, supra, at p. 5.)
Justice Thomas had been in the majority in Almendarez-Torres, but switched sides to provide the crucial fifth vote in Apprendi. In his separate concurrence in Apprendi, Justice Thomas indicated that he regretted his Almendarez-Torres vote and made plain that he saw a right to jury trial on any fact increasing the maximum sentence, including a prior conviction. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 520-521 (Thomas, J., concur.).) Consequently, there should be 5 votes to overrule AlmendarezTorres -the 4 original dissenters plus Thomas (the same 5 who comprised the majority in both Apprendi and Blakely). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court did not actually do so in Apprendi, and, by its cert. denials over the intervening 4 years, it has passed up other opportunities to revisit Almendarez-Torres. Consequently, both California and federal courts have ruled that AlmendarezTorres remains the law and, pending any further word from the Supreme Court, there is no right to jury determination of a prior conviction or prior prison term enhancement. (E.g., People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 23; United States v. Yanez-Saucedo (9th Cir. 2002) 295 F.3d 991, 993.) As with Apprendi challenges to lack of jury trial on "strikes" and other prior conviction enhancements, counsel may still want to raise a Blakely/Apprendi challenge to judicial determination of recidivist aggravating factors in order to ensure preservation of the claim in the event the U.S. Supreme Court grants cert. to resolve the issue sometime in the near future. But the remainder of this discussion will assume that Almendarez-Torres is still good law and that, as suggested by Blakely's quotation of Apprendi, there is no right to jury determination of DSL aggravating circumstances which consist of "the fact of a prior conviction." However, that still leaves considerable doubt as to which precise aggravating circumstances come within the Apprendi/Blakely right to jury trial and which within the Almendarez-Torres exception for prior convictions.
Even within the more traditional context of enhancements and "strikes," there is uncertainty over whether there is a right to jury trial on some aspects of recidivist allegations. The California Supreme Court recently granted review to consider whether Apprendi requires determination of additional facts necessary to prove that an out-of-state prior conviction qualified as a "strike" (where the least adjudicated elements of the out-of-state robbery fell short of California's definition of the offense). (People v. McGee (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 819, review granted, Apr. 28, 2004 (S123474).) There is also continuing debate over whether a prior juvenile adjudication alleged as a "strike" properly comes within the Almendarez-Torres exception since (in contrast to an adult conviction) the defendant never had the right to jury trial in the juvenile case. Applying the elusive Apprendi/Almendarez-Torres distinction to California's DSL aggravating factors may prove even more difficult than the similar questions surrounding enhancements and strikes. Assuming that Blakely applies to the California DSL structure in the first place, all the "facts relating to the crime" listed in rule 4.421(a) should come squarely within the Apprendi category of enhancing facts subject to the right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But the converse is not true. The "facts relating to the defendant" listed in rule 4.421(b) do all arise from a defendant's criminal record. But it would not be appropriate to withhold Apprendi protection from all rule 4.421(b) determinations on the theory that Almendarez-Torres broadly exempts all "redicivist" facts from these rights. (2) findings ("prior convictions...numerous or of increasing seriousness") will probably come within AlmendarezTorres rather than Apprendi in most cases where the court is relying only upon "the fact of a prior conviction," such as the sheer number of priors or the "increasing seriousness" evident from the sequence of statutory offenses (e.g. petty theft, grand theft, robbery with gun use). But probation reports typically, though not always, provide brief blurbs on the facts of prior offenses (usually drawn from police reports). To the extent a court bases a finding of "increasing seriousness" upon details beyond the least adjudicated elements of prior offenses, that determination poses potential Apprendi problems similar to a court's finding of extrinsic facts necessary to bring a prior within the "strike"/"serious felony" definition (an issue pending before the California Supreme Court in People v. Mcgee, supra, S123474). Similarly, to the extent a rule 4.421(b)(3) determination rests on juvenile adjudications, it raises the same issues as use of such adjudications as "strikes." (Cf. United States v. Tighe, supra, 266 F.3d 1187.)
The probation-and parole-related factors also present a mixed picture. The bare fact of a defendant's probation or parole status at the time of the current crime (rule 4.421(b)(4)) appears analogous to a prior prison term (and thus probably exempt from Apprendi) because it is a simple "objective" determination of legal status, shown by judicial and correctional records. But unsatisfactory performance on parole or probation is another matter, especially if it rests only upon the parole/probation officer's characterization of a defendant's compliance rather than on a record of formal violation findings and revocations. Moreover, even if there were formal revocations, those should not be given the same pass as prior convictions because they were not attended by similar procedural safeguards (a critical component of the Almendarez-Torres rationale) -neither a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, "violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to society" (rule 4.421(b)(1)) may be the most problematic of all the rule 4.421(b), because it may not necessarily be tethered to any prior formal adjudication. It may rest upon unadjudicated aspects of the current case (which would bring it squarely within Apprendi), upon unadjudicated aspects of some prior case (which would arguably present an Apprendi problem), or even upon prior arrests or other matters which never resulted in a prior conviction.
In short, application of Blakely and Apprendi to rule 4.421(b) aggravators will likely require very close case-by-case dissection of the specific facts underlying an asserted factor. A recidivismrelated aggravating factor falls cleanly into the Almendarez-Torres column only where the circumstance consisted of the bare "fact of a prior conviction" (or prison term), rather than any extrinsic facts. In all other instances, there is at least a potential issue.
Distinguishing "facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." As quoted earlier, the core holding of Blakely is "that the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." (Blakely, supra, at p. 7, emphasis in original.) There will no doubt be many case-by-case disputes over whether particular aggravating circumstances, beyond the minimum statutory elements of an offense, were somehow "reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant" in his plea.
It would be dangerous to conflate this standard with the "factual basis" for a plea or verdict. The focus of Blakely (and its precursors, Apprendi and Ring) is on the jury's findings or the defendant's admissions. In the case of a plea, that should be the plea waiver form or any other plea agreement executed by the defendant and the defendant's own statements and reponses during the plea colloquy. Those are the only facts truly "admitted by the defendant." The court's duty to ensure there is a "factual basis" for a negotiated plea ( § 1192.5) is a creature of legislative limitations on plea bargaining and should not be confused with the more limited scope of a defendant's own admissions. Thus, for example, the attorneys' stipulatation that the court may look to the preliminary hearing transcript or a police report as a "factual basis" for section 1192.5 purposes is not tantamount to an admission by the defendant of everything asserted in those documents.
Similarly, in the case of jury verdicts, the focus must be on the jury's actual findings. It is fair to look to the jury instructions, as well as the verdicts and any enhancement findings, to determine which facts the jurors necessarily found. But it would not be appropriate to look to additional matters seemingly apparent from the trial transcript which were not the subject of instructions and verdicts. It bears emphasis that, under the terms of the majority opinion, "Blakely error" is simply one form of Apprendi error. Consequently, we should subject an aggravating circumstance which was not the subject of a specific jury finding to the same scrutiny as imposition of an enhancement which was never submitted to the jury. No one would dispute that imposition of a weapon or GBI enhancement would represent Apprendi error if those enhancements were not submitted to the jury, even if the trial revolved entirely around identity issues and there was never any true dispute about weapon use or GBI. Similarly, at least for purposes of the "error" determination, the inquiry should focus strictly upon a comparison of the jury instructions and verdicts with the aggravating circumstances later cited by the court.
Upon analysis of "the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant," some upper terms will probably be secure from challenge because the aggravating circumstances rested upon facts either admitted or found elsewhere in the case. For example, many probationdisqualifying allegations are tried to a jury; a sentencing court's reliance upon the "large quantity of contraband" as an aggravating circumstance (rule 4.421(a)(10)) would probably not offend Blakely if the jury had already returned a drug quantity finding in some other context. Similarly, if there were multiple convictions (either by plea or verdict) and the defendant received concurrent terms, a court could legitimately rely on those other counts as a basis for an upper term on the principal count. (Rule 4.421(a)(7).) LITIGATING BLAKELEY CLAIMS. 
Retroactivity. As stated in another Apprendi-related opinion issued the same day as Blakely

) Even assuming that
Blakely is a logical application of Apprendi's principles to a different sentencing scheme (as the majority opinion states), it is hard to say that Apprendi "dictated" this outcome. Indeed, as reflected in the astonished reaction among both the defense and prosecution bars, no one saw it coming. As noted elsewhere in Justice O'Connor's dissent, every single federal circuit had rejected Apprendi challenges to the federal sentencing guidelines, and only a single court (the Kansas Supreme Court) had sustained such a challenge to a state guidelines regimen. (Blakely, supra, O'Connor, J., dissenting opn. at p. 7 fn. 1.)
In short, the putative threat to sentences which became final during the Apprendi-Blakely window seems to be more a case of a dissent's exaggeration of the implications of a majority opinion, than a realistic possibility.
Waiver.
A sentencing court's imposition of an upper term based on an aggravating circumstance not "reflected in the jury's verdict or admitted by the defendant" should not come within the usual Scott rule requiring a contemporaneous objection to preserve appellate review of defects in sentencing reasons. In several cases over the past decade, the California Supreme Court has held that a failure to object cannot waive "certain fundamental constitutional rights," such as double jeopardy and the right to jury trial, even though that omission may forfeit appellate review of related state statutory claims. In People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, the Court applied that distinction to a defendant's failure to object to the discharge of the jury, prior to the adjudication of charged priors. That omission forfeited the right to contest the premature discharge as a violation of the state statutory provisions requiring the same jury to determine both the currently charged crime and any alleged priors ( § § 1025, 1164) (see id. at pp. 589-592), but not the right to raise the more fundamental claims of double jeopardy and jury trial. "Defendant's failure to object also would not preclude his asserting on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial. .) The futility exception should also apply where the statutory or case law binding the lower court at the time would have precluded the claim. (Cf. People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 116, fn.6 [no waiver where lower court was bound by higher court on issue].) Until June 24, 2004, it would have been pointless to demand a jury trial or a resonable doubt standard on DSL aggravating circumstances, since California statutory and case law unequivocally prescribed judicial factfinding under a preponderance standard. Even in the context of evidentiary claims (where the courts have generally enforced waiver rules most strictly), the California Supreme Court has allowed review of unraised claims based on a significant supervening change in the law: "Though evidentiary challenges are usually waived unless timely raised in the trial court, this is not so when the pertinent law later changed so unforeseeably that it is unreasonable to expect trial counsel to have anticipated the change. [Citations.]" (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703.) Finally, in post-jury trial appeals a Blakely claim may also be cognizable, without the necessity of an objection below, on the ground that the underlying error was the failure to instruct the jury on the aggravating factor. Consequently, the claim could come within section 1259, allowing appellate review of any instruction which affects the defendant's "substantial rights."
Harmless error. The disposition in Blakely was a remand to the Washington appellate court "for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." (Blakely, supra, at p. 18 .) The opinion did not address whether the error necessarily required reversal of the sentence or was susceptible to harmless error review.
Ideally, of course, we would like to characterize Blakely error as a form of "structural defect," not amenable to harmless error review, on the theory that the wrong entity, the judge rather than the jury, has adjudicated the aggravating factor and has applied the wrong standard of proof. (Cf. Sullivan v Louisana (1993) 508 U.S. 275.) If the aggravator were viewed as comparable to a distinct charge (such as a separate count), the structural defect argument would carry some weight because there was a complete denial of jury trial as to that charge. But, in the contexts of more traditional enhancements, the courts have tended to view enhancing facts as comparable to extra "elements" of the underlying offense. Under that analogy, a failure to submit an enhancement to the jury is a nonstructural error akin to omission of an element of the offense from the jury instructions and therefore subject to harmless error. (See Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1.)
Both the California Supreme Court and the federal circuits have held that conventional Apprendi errors on enhancements are subject to the Chapman standard. (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 324; People v. Scott (2001 ) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197 , 1209 -1211 United States v. Garcia-Guizar (9 th Cir. 2000) 234 F.3d 483, 488-489.) Although the California Supreme Court's opinion in Sengpadychith involved an omission of a discrete element of an enhancement (the "primary activities" element of the gang enhancement, § 186.22(b)) rather than a complete failure to submit the enhancement to the jury, the Court's characterization of Apprendi implies that it would analyze the latter, more grave error, under Chapman as well: "Apprendi treated the crime together with its sentence enhancement as the 'functional equivalent' of a single 'greater' crime." (Sengpadychith, supra, at p. 324.) Of course, even if Blakely errors are not considered "structural defects," this only begs the question of how exactly Chapman review should operate in this context. There has long been a tendency of California courts to view Chapman as merely altering the probability standard for prejudice and permitting a finding of harmless error whenever there is assertedly "overwhelming evidence" of guilt (or, in Even assuming that Blakely errors will be subject to Chapman (which appears likely in light of both state and federal treatment of Apprendi), it will be essential for appellate defense counsel to insist upon fidelity to the Neder formulation of Chapman review, rather upon the more generic "overwhelming evidence" version of Chapman to which California courts have been prone in the past.
Blakely error may also represent one form of appellate claim in which the post-plea defendant may well stand in a better position than a defendant who went to to trial. The Blakely majority viewed the "extraordinary sentence" there as a punishment greater than authorized by Blakely's plea. It was as if Blakely had received the sentence corresponding to a greater crime than the one to which he pled. There seems to be little room for Chapman analysis in that context. On the other hand, some plea situations could pose more difficult prejudice questions -such as where a court relies on multiple aggravating circumstances, some of which violate Blakely and some of which fall outside it (such as prior convictions within the Almendarez-Torres exception or current conduct circumstances adequately supported by pleas, admissions, or jury findings on other counts or allegations). Under one view of Apprendi prejudice analysis (which, sadly, may find support in some federal decisions) the presence of one valid aggravating circumstance might be viewed as sufficient to render Apprendi error on another circumstance harmless because one legitimately-determined aggravating circumstance is sufficient to increase a defendant's maximum exposure to an upper term. Yet, if the Chapman analysis is to focus on the relationship between the error and the ultimate sentence, the inquiry should be whether there is a reasonable doubt the court would have imposed the same sentence if it had confined itself
MORE DISCLAIMERS.
Have we mentioned that these are PRELIMINARY thoughts on Blakely? This posting represents one staff attorney's over-the-weekend ruminations on the possible implications of Blakely for California's DSL. There are several important topics which this preliminary outline either omits altogether or covers only superficially. Here are a few obvious candidates for further research and brainstorming:
C
More about the Washington sentencing structure? One question of particular interest is the "standard range" for a sentence (which, in Blakely itself was 49 to 53 months). While Blakely explains the Washington procedures for "departing" from the "standard range" and imposing an "extraordinary sentence," it does not discuss the standards governing how a Washington court selects a specific term within the "standard range." Is that determination left to the judge's discretion, without any further specification of factual criteria? As discussed earlier, a Blakely challenge to California's DSL procedures depends on the notion that (due to the statutory presumption of a middle term, etc. .) It could be useful to examine whether the original Kansas system resembled California's DSL or instead followed a guidelines-and-departure model similar to the Washington statute or the federal sentencing guidelines.
Consecutive sentencing? These materials have focused on the choice of an upper term. But could Blakely conceivably apply to findings used to justify consecutive terms? This is a more difficult question because there does not appear to be any statutory presumption of concurrent sentencing comparable to section 1170(b)'s mandate that a court "shall" impose a middle term unless it finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
C "Harvey waivers" and other problems posed by plea agreements? Even where a defendant does not explicitly "admit" additional facts as part of his plea, other common provisions in California negotiated pleas could pose problems for Blakely arguments. In particular, could a defendant's "Harvey waiver" be construed as consent to judicial factfinding regarding the alleged conduct underlying dismissed counts? For currently pending cases (i.e., pre-Blakely pleas) any such "waiver" or "consent" analysis would seem unfair because a defendant cannot knowingly and voluntarily waive a right which neither he nor his attorney knew he had in the first place.
C Much more research necessary on harmless error. Though the subject is plainly of critical importance, this memorandum's treatment of prejudice/harmless error questions is superficial and speculative. It rests upon only a few applications of Chapman to Apprendi error "close to home" in California (and the Ninth Circuit). However, because California statutes and case law required jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of enhancement allegations, even before Apprendi, there are relatively few cases of outright Apprendi error in California -i.e., complete failure to submit an enhancement to the jury. (California cases on Apprendi have generally involved less grevious errors, such as the incomplete enhancement instructions in Sengpadychith.) There is much more case law "out there" assessing Apprendi errors which may be more comparable to those implicated by Blakely, but most of that case law is probably in the federal courts and other jurisdictions. However, in order to assess the likely prejudice/harmless error framework facing Blakely claims, it will be essential to develop a better-informed picture of how courts across the country have dealt with Apprendi errors.
C Means of raising Blakely claims. In any case which is still pending on direct review in the appellate court, this should pose no difficulty. Even if the case has already been briefed (or even argued), counsel can seek leave to file a supplemental brief. But what about cases farther along in the pipeline? As noted earlier, Blakely applies to all cases not yet final on direct review, and a case ordinarily is not deemed final until the time for petitioning for cert. has expired. But that still leaves the question of how a defendant is to raise the claim if the case is no longer in the Court of Appeal -such as where a petition for review is pending or the case is in the 90-day "cert. window" following a denial of review. Is the defendant's only option to file a state habeas corpus petition (and, if so, in which court should he file it)? **** Again, this memo presents only the most preliminary and rudimentary analysis of Blakely's implications for California. More will follow in the coming weeks and months. Good luck.
